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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper constitutes the first chapter in my work-in-progress manuscript, Microeconomic Theory:  
A Heterodox Approach.  Because many heterodox feel that the only micro theory is mainstream 
micro, the paper starts with a brief rejection of mainstream theory.  It then proceeds to give an 
overview of heterodox economic theory.  The third section defines heterodox microeconomic theory 
and relates it to heterodox value theory.  Since heterodox economic theory and particularly 
microeconomic theory is not already formed, it has to be created.  Thus the fourth section of the 
paper delineates the heterodox methodology of theory creation, which includes critical realism and 
the method of grounded theory, and discusses various methodological issues such as data, case 
studies, mathematics and modeling, and econometrics.  The following section deals with the 
historical character of heterodox economic theories; and the paper ends with a discussion about the 
making of heterodox microeconomic theory that will take place in the subsequent chapters of the 
book.    
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3 
THE MAKING OF HETERODOX MICROECONOMICS 
Economics as a discipline is a specialized, scientific, factual body of knowledge that 
endeavors to develop theoretical explanations of real economic activities that connect individuals 
with the goods and services needed to sustain their existence over time.  The economic activities are 
not isolated or emenate from the efforts of an isolated individual, but rather are enmeshed with others 
to form a system of economic activities or the economy.  Similarly, individuals are not isolated, but 
are enmeshed in various social relationships that cannot be stripped away.  Together they imply that 
economic activities are an emergent system of social-economic activities that generate an array of 
goods and services needed to sustain the social individuals and their social relationships, and thus 
society as a whole.  Consequently, economics is about developing theoretical explanations of the 
social provisioning process—that is economics is defined as the science of the social provisioning 
process.  For any factual field of inquiry or scientific research field to exist, it must have a research 
community whose members exist in a society that at least tolerates if not supports their research 
activities.  Moreover, its object of study must be real (as opposed to fictitious or non-existent) and 
relate to the problems and issues that are the focus of the research community.  Finally, the methods 
used by the researchers to study the objects and address the problems and issues need to be grounded 
in the real world.  Economics as a research field has a research community, albeit one divided 
between mainstream and heterodox economists, that are located within a society that supports it more 
(for mainstream economics) or less (for heterodox economics).  The two sub-fields of economics, 
mainstream and heterodox economics, have some overlapping objects of study and problems and 
issues to address, but much less overlapping of methods used to study the objects and issues, which 
ultimately generate quite distinct theoretical and hence rival explanations of the social provisioning 
process.  What makes mainstream and heterodox economics distinctly different is that the former, at 
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a fundamental level, is not capable of developing coherent, theoretical explanations of the social 
provisioning process that are grounded in the real world.
1
   
This claim merits further but brief discussion.  First, the objects of study of mainstream 
economics, such as preferences-utility, marginal products, demand curves, rationality, relative 
scarcity, and homogeneous agents, are ill-defined, have no real world existence, and where relevant 
are non-quantifiable, non-measurable.
2
  Consequently, the issues and problems for which the objects 
are relevant, such as competitive markets, efficiency, and constrained optimality are either fictitious 
in that they are unrelated to the real world; or if the issues and problems are clearly located in the real 
world, such as prices or unemployment, the objects have no bearing on their existence.  Secondly, the 
methods used by mainstream economists to develop theoretical explanations addressing the issues 
and problems, such as deductive methodology and ontological and methodological individualism, 
generally include fictitious objects and utilize concepts that have no grounding hence no meaning in 
the real world.  Together, they clearly suggest that it is not possible for mainstream economists to 
conjure up any theoretical explanations relevant to the provisioning process that takes place in the 
real world.  In addition, the mainstream theory of the provisioning process, which is as Hirshleifer 
argues (1985: 53) the core area of study of mainstream economics, is itself also quite problematical.  
The core propositions of the theory, such as scarcity, preferences and utility functions, technology 
and production functions, rationality, maximization/optimalization, market clearing, equilibrium, 
ontological and methodological individualism, heterogeneous agents, and positivist and deductivist 
methodology, have all been subject to intensive heterodox critiques; and in many cases there are 
multiple, overlapping heterodox critiques of core propositions.
3
  But even if the critiques are ignored, 
it is well-known that it is not possible to generate internally coherent explanations or stories or 
parables of market activity (such as the pervasive urban legend of the market as a self-adjusting 
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mechanism) at either the micro or the macro level; and even if particular stories (represented in terms 
of models) of market activities are accepted, such as general equilibrium, game theory, or IS-LM, 
they have been shown, on their own terms, to be theoretically incoherent and empirically 
unsupported.  The combination of critiques and incoherence means that none of the mainstream 
theoretical concepts or more generally its theoretical language and narrative story can be transferred 
to heterodox economics. [Rizvi 1994; Lawson, 1997a; Keen 2001; Lee and Keen 2004; Ackerman 
and Nadal 2004; White 2004; Petri 2004; Palacio-Vera 2005]      
The above arguments suggest that mainstream theory lacks truth and value and contributes 
nothing (not even terms such as equilibrium, demand curve, or short period) to explaining the social 
provisioning process in a capitalist economy.  Hence, it is not surprising that mainstream theory has 
become increasingly separated from its subject matter and progressively engaged in articulating 
properties of internally generated models.  Nor is it surprising that its method of evaluating its 
fictional theories is to compare the projected fictional outcomes of a fictional model to actual data as 
if this had any meaning.  Finally, it is not surprising that mainstream economists are increasingly 
defining economics as a particular method of inquiry without factual content.   Given the fictitious 
nature of mainstream theory, it arguably represents bogus, false, or pseudo-knowledge because ―it 
refers to non-existents or because it represents existents in an utterly false manner‖ (Bunge, 1983b, 
195).  Thus, mainstream theory is not a rival scientific theory to heterodox theory because it is not 
‗scientific‘, although it remains a non-scientific rival much like Creationism is non-scientific rival of 
the theory of evolution.
4
  The fact that it is considered part of the research field of economics 
indicates the extent to which economics is a highly contested discipline where non-scientific aims 
and attitudes still play a significant role.  Therefore, economics is perhaps a protoscience or semi-
science with heterodox economics representing pockets of an almost mature science. [Bunge, 1983b, 
  
 
 
 
 
6 
1985, 1998; Mahner, 2007] 
HETERODOX ECONOMICS 
As stated above, economics is the science of the social provisioning process and that 
scientific endeavor is best carried out by heterodox economics.  Heterodox economics refers to a 
specific group of theories aimed at explaining it, to economic policies recommendations predicated 
on the theories, and to a community of economists engaged in this theoretical and applied scientific 
activity.  Heterodox economic theory specifically focuses on human agency in a cultural context and 
social processes in historical time affecting and directing resources and their usage, consumption 
patterns, production and reproduction, and the meaning (or ideology) of economic activities engaged 
in social provisioning utilizing empirically grounded concepts and an open system, grounded theory 
methodology.  However, for the occurrence of such scientific activity, there must exists a research 
community of heterodox economists and its existence must be, to some degree, supported by society 
at large. 
Community of Heterodox Economists 
The scientific research community of heterodox economists is grounded in a social system of 
work that produces scientific or economic knowledge that contributes to the understanding of the 
economy and the social provisioning process. Moreover, this system of work is largely embedded in 
educational systems and their employment markets. So, although economic research and employment 
can be found in a variety of non-educational institutions, such as governments, private or public 
research institutes, trade unions, and advocacy organizations, the reproduction and expansion of the 
community is primarily tied to the academy.  This means that the social system of work for heterodox 
economists is (as for mainstream economists) located in university economics departments.  In 
particular, the department is the local employment market, establishes the career structure, is the 
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organizational locale for teaching students and training future heterodox economists, and is the site 
for the production of heterodox scientific knowledge that must be publishable in referred journals, 
books, and other reputable outlets.
5
  In addition to university departments, there are other 
organizations that support and compliment the social system of work and support and promote the 
development of heterodox economic theory, including journals, book publishers, professional 
associations, and informal groups. Their importance is that they help sustain through their material 
property, financial support, and organizational activities, the various heterodox departments within 
the heterodox community. In turn, the departments, connected by various social networks, provide 
the positive critical rivalry necessary for intellectual creativity within the community.  
The social network of heterodox economists consists of direct and indirect social 
relationships between heterodox economists. The relationships or social ties include correspondence; 
intellectual and social interactions at conferences, in seminars, or with students—such as teacher-
student relationship; and belonging to the same mailing lists, subscribing to and publishing in the 
same journals, attending the same conferences and seminars, and supporting a common course of 
action. Thus, a social network produces a connected and integrated body of specialized individuals 
who develop a common set of arguments, are concerned with a common set of questions and topics, 
and develop common standards for judging the arguments, answers, and discourse. In other words, 
the network acts as a chain of intellectual discourses where intellectual interaction through face-to-
face situations at seminars, in conferences, or over dinner brings together the intellectual community; 
focuses members‘ attention on and builds up vested interest in their own theoretical, historical, 
applied, and empirical topics and problems; and ties together written texts and lectures that are the 
long-term life of the community and gives its distinctiveness. The concatenated discourse that 
emerges from the face-to-face interaction keeps up the consciousness of the community‘s agenda and 
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purpose by transcending all particular occasions of the interactions—that is, the discourse that 
emerges ensures that the community‘s purpose and agenda continue to be advocated independently of 
any individual member of the community or any specific face-to-face interaction. The discourse also 
has another impact in that it is the communicative process that creates thinkers within the 
community. [Lee 2009] 
Heterodox Economic Theory:  Interpreting the Past for the Purposes of the Present with a 
View to Managing the Future
6
 
The intellectual and theoretical roots of heterodox economics are located in heterodox 
traditions of Post Keynesian-Sraffian, Marxist-radical, Institutional-evolutionary, social, feminist, 
and ecological economics, all of whom emphasize the social surplus, accumulation, justice, social 
relationships in terms of class, gender, and race, full employment, and economic and social 
reproduction.
7
 Hence, as a scientific research field, heterodox economics is concerned with 
explaining and proposing and advocating changes in the historical process of producing the social 
surplus that provides the flow of goods and services required by society to meet the reoccurring 
needs and promote the well-being of those who participate in its activities. That is, heterodox 
economics is a historical science of the social provisioning process, and this is the general research 
agenda of heterodox economists. Drawing from all heterodox approaches, its explanation involves 
both human agency embedded in a transmutable hence uncertain world with fallible knowledge and 
expectations and in a cultural context and social processes in historical time affecting resources, 
consumption patterns, production and reproduction, and the meaning (or ideology) of market, state, 
and non-market/state activities engaged in social provisioning. This implies that agency can only take 
place in an interdependent social context which emphasizes the social and deemphasizes the isolated 
nature ofindividual decision-making; and that the organization of social provisioning is determined 
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outside of markets, although the provisioning process itself will, in part, take place through capitalist 
markets. Thus heterodox economic theory is a theoretical explanation of the historical process of 
social provisioning within the context of a capitalist economy; and hence it is also a historically 
contextual explanation. Therefore it is concerned with explaining those factors that are part of the 
process of social provisioning, including the structure and use of resources, the structure and change 
of social wants, structure of production and the reproduction of the business enterprise, family, state, 
and other relevant institutions and organizations, and distribution. In addition, heterodox economists 
extend their theory to examining issues associated with the process of social provisioning, such as 
racism, gender, and ideologies and myths. 
Because heterodox economics involves issues of ethical values and social philosophy and the 
historical aspects of human existence, heterodox economists feel that it is also their duty to make 
heterodox economic policy recommendations to improve human dignity, that is, recommending 
ameliorative and/or radical social and economic policies to improve the social provisioning for all 
members of society and especially the disadvantage members. Moreover, they adopt the view that 
their economic policy recommendations must be based on an accurate historical and theoretical 
picture of how the economy actually works—a picture that includes class and hierarchical 
domination, inequalities, social-economic discontent, and conflict. The distinction between theory 
and policy is not the same as the positive-normative distinction found in mainstream economics. 
Heterodox theory is an explanation of how the social provisioning process actually operates, not how 
it is suppose to operate under ‗ideal conditions‘; while heterodox policy aims at altering the actual 
process to achieve a particular historically contingent outcome. Thus the ethos embedded in 
heterodox economic theory is that the social provisioning process is to be accurately explained so 
that it can be changed—an accurate explanation is not the same thing as a value neutral explanation, 
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which implies that derivative economic policy is not value qua ethically neutral. [Polanyi 1968; 
Foster 1981; Gruchy 1987; Stevenson 1987; Dugger 1996; Bortis 1997; Hodgson 2001; Power 2004] 
Theoretical Core 
 Since the economy is an emergent system with various sub-systems, the heterodox theory of 
the social provisioning process is also an emergent theoretical system with various theoretical sub-
systems.  This implies that it cannot be divided into disjointed sub-systems of microeconomics and 
macroeconomics which in turn are based on quite different theoretical arguments.  In particular, the 
core theoretical elements generate a three-component structure-organization-agency heterodox 
economic theory.
8
 The first component of the theory consists of the productive and monetary 
structures of the social provisioning process and together they form the structure of a real capitalist 
economy. The former represents production as a circular process in that the production of goods and 
services requires goods and services to be used as inputs. Hence, with regard to production, the 
overall economy (which includes both market and non-market production) is represented as an input-
output table of resources, material goods, and services combined with different types of labor skills 
to produce an array of resources, goods, and services as outputs. Many of the outputs replace the 
resources, goods, and services used up in production and the rest constitute a surplus to be used for 
social provisioning, that is for consumption, private investment, government usage, and exports. The 
latter depicts the structural relationships between the wages of workers, profits of enterprises, and 
taxes of government and expenditures on consumption, investment, and government goods as well as 
non-market social provisioning activities which is facilitated by a flow of funds or state money 
accompanying the production and exchange of the goods and services. Together the two structures 
produce a monetary input-output structure of the economy as a whole where transactions in each 
market are a state-money transaction; where a change in price of a good or in the method by which a 
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good is produced in any one market will have an indirect or direct impact on the entire economy; and 
where the amount of private investment, government expenditure on real goods and services, and the 
excess of exports over imports determines the amount of market and non-market economic activity, 
the level of market employment and non-market laboring activities, and consumer expenditures on 
market and non-market goods and services. 
 The second component of heterodox theory consists of three categories of economic 
organizations and institutions that are embedded in the monetary input-output structure of the 
economy. The first category is particular to a set of markets and products and consists of the business 
enterprise, private and public market organizations (such as cartels and government marketing 
boards) that regulate competition in resource, good, and service markets, and the organizations (such 
as trade unions) and institutions (such as minimum wage laws) that regulate the wages of workers. 
The second is spread across markets and products, or is not particular to any market or product and 
includes the state and various subsidiary organizations as well as particular financial organizations, 
that is, those organizations (such as Congress and the central bank) which make decisions about 
government expenditures and taxation, and determine the interest rate. Finally the third category 
consists of non-market organizations and institutions that promote social reproduction and include 
the household and state and private organizations (such as charities) that contribute to and support 
the household. The significance of organizations is that they are where agency qua the socialized 
individual, the third component of heterodox theory, is located. That is, agency, which consists of 
decisions made by individuals, concerning the social provisioning process and social well-being 
takes place through these organizations. And because the organizations are embedded in both 
instrumental and ceremonial institutions, such as gender, class, ethnicity, justice, marriage, ideology, 
and hierarchy as authority, agency acting through organizations affect both positively and negatively 
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but never optimally the social provisioning process. 
HETERODOX MICROECONOMICS 
 As argued above, the position adopted in this book is that heterodox economic theory is an 
emergent whole and the economy is conceived as a disaggregated interdependent system.
9
 
Consequently, to theorize about the social provisioning process in terms of a disaggregated, 
interdependent economy, it is necessary to delineate and explain its constituent parts and their 
reproduction and recurrence, their integration qua interdependency by non-market and market 
arrangements and institutions, and how the system works as a whole, which implies examining how 
changes in one part of the economy produces changes in other parts as well as the economy as a 
whole. As a result heterodox microeconomics is concerned with delineating and explaining the 
constituent parts or sub-systems of the economy and their interdependencies, while heterodox 
macroeconomics is concerned with the economy as a whole and changes that occur as a result of 
changes in various parts of the economy.
10
  
The sub-systems include the business enterprise and other private business organizations such 
as cartels, the household, and state-public organizations, while the interdependencies include 
technological-production relationships between enterprises, private investment-government 
expenditures and profit-employment, wages-capitalist income and workers-capitalist consumption 
patterns, state expenditures and taxes-financial assets. Heterodox microeconomic theory thus 
involves working with the sub-systems and interdependencies to develop analytical narratives, that is, 
theoretical explanations that contribute to understanding the social provisioning process. In principle, 
heterodox microeconomics consists of theories ranging from pricing, markets, and urban 
development to the household and the state. For this book, however, the scope will be limited to 
theorizing about the more traditional sub-systems and interdependencies. Because of the significance 
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of the price mechanism to mainstream economics, one theoretical concern of the book is the business 
enterprise, markets, demand, and pricing. Also, since heterodox economists see private investment, 
consumption and government expenditures as the principle directors and drivers of economic 
activity, a second theoretical concern is business decision-making regarding investment and 
production, government expenditure decisions, the financing of investment, the profit mark up and 
the wage rate, and taxes. Finally, the third theoretical concern of the book is the delineation of a 
model of a going economy as a whole, which includes the productive and monetary structures of the 
social provisioning process, a price model, and an output-employment model. The integration of the 
theories of the business enterprise, markets, demand, investment, finance, and the state with a 
theoretical model of the going economy forms a nexus of theory that can be identified as heterodox 
microeconomics. 
Microeconomics and Heterodox Theory of Value 
 Emerging from heterodox microeconomics contributions to the theoretical explanation of the 
social provisioning process are accounts about the origins of the social surplus (or the questions of 
the origins of profits, wages, and rents) and access to the provisioning process (or the question of 
producing and distributing the surplus).  Through dealing with these issues, the theoretical narrative 
of the provisioning process is transformed it into a theory of value.  That is, a theory of value is a 
narrative which is linked to a quantitative analysis (usually a model or a concatenated set of models) 
that succinctly explains why and how the particular goods and services that constitute the social 
provisioning process get produced and the households, business enterprises, and the state get access 
to them.  Consequently, the particulars of the explanation include the origins of the income variables 
(wage rates and profit mark ups) that give access to the surplus and hence to the provisioning 
process; the determination of prices and their role in affecting economic activity; the determination 
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of the social surplus, total social product, and employment; the ‗real costs‘ of producing the social 
surplus; the distribution of the consumption goods between and within the three social classes; and 
the distribution of fixed investment goods and state financial assets among business enterprises 
(Dobb 1945:  1-33).  The explanation also includes an examination of the state as the political unit in 
which the provisioning process is located and its role in affecting and directing economic activity.   
The narrative of heterodox value theory is quite explicit as it is brief.  It starts (and also ends) 
with the observation that the material basis of the social provisioning process is determined by the 
ruling class—the capitalist class and the political elite of the dependent capitalist state—for society 
as a whole. This is possible since the composition and amount of the total social surplus is 
determined by the ruling class, they have the dominant influence qua control over the economy and 
society; and since the capitalist class via the business enterprise administratively set going enterprise 
prices, profit mark ups, and wages while the state sets wages, employs people, and makes 
government and interest payments, the ruling class determines through non-market decisions both the 
general access and the differential access to social provisioning.  Expanding upon the narrative, the 
ruling class determines the surplus goods and services they want and hire the surplus labor to 
produce them; and the production of surplus goods and services for workers are an unintended by-
product.  That is to say, the production decisions are controlled by the ruling class.  This means that 
the capitalists‘ decision to produce consumption goods and services for workers governs the workers‘ 
access to the social provisioning process by simultaneously creating the wage rate as an income 
category.  In a similar manner, the capitalists and state decisions to produce fixed investment and 
consumption goods and services for the capitalists and for the state governs the capitalists‘ and the 
state‘s access to the social provisioning process by simultaneously creating the profit mark up and 
state money as a income categories.  In short, because the capitalist class and the state determine the 
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production of the surplus and with it wage rates, profit mark ups, and state money, they govern the 
real direction of the capitalist economy, control the volume of and access to the social provisioning 
process (while the price system plays a secondary role of governing the access of particular capitalists 
and workers to social provisioning and ensuring the reproduction of the business enterprise), and 
maintain the capitalist (dominate)-worker (subordinate) social relationships necessary for capitalism 
to exist.  What this clearly implies is that the creation and distribution of the surplus is effectuated 
through the social relationships that sustain the ruling class, while the trappings of market forces are 
a veil that obscures them; or more strongly put:  it is social relationships couple with social agency 
that are the primary movers of economic activity and the provisioning process while the role of 
markets and the price system play both a secondary role and an obscuring role.  Heterodox 
microeconomics pierces this veil and reveals what is hidden and obscured. 
METHODOLOGY OF HETERODOX ECONOMICS 
 
 Heterodox economic theory is not a pre-existing doctrine to be applied to an invariant 
economic reality—it just does not exist ahistorically ready for application.  There are, of course, 
many theoretical arguments that have been advanced which appear to contribute to its construction 
but there is no reason why they should command blind acceptance and, in any case, they fall short of 
making a comprehensive theory.  Consequently, new factual theories are needed to fill the gaps.  In 
either case, there needs to be a basis for accepting the theories as reasonable scientific theoretical 
contributions to explaining the social provisioning process.  This suggests that the delineation of 
heterodox microeconomic theory takes the form of theory creation.  Scientific theory creation 
requires a methodology for the task and the methodology is the method of grounded theory, and its 
philosophical foundation of realism, critical realism, and epistemological relativism.  
Philosophical Foundation 
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 Being both participants in and observers of the social and economic activity around them, 
heterodox economists approach their study of economics with a common sense understanding of the 
world.  By common sense, it is meant a complex set of beliefs and propositions (many of which are 
historically grounded) about fundamental features of the world that individuals assume in whatever 
they do in ordinary life.  Thus, they take particular features, characteristics, institutions, and human 
actors of economic activity as real, obvious, and practical initial starting points for further research.  
To be real, obvious, and practical means that various features, institutions, and actors exist, are 
ingrained everyday properties of the world of economic activity, and are encountered when observing 
or participating in ongoing economic activity.  In particular, heterodox economists can, as observers, 
see them in action in the economy; or they can directly experience them as participants in economic 
activity.  By being a participant-observer, they are able to be close to the real, concrete form of the 
economy.  Consequently their common sense beliefs and propositions provide the background 
against which they carry out their research.  Hence, this common sense understanding of economic 
activity informs the methods which heterodox economists actually use to examine economic activity, 
particularly with regard to the way it is explained. [Coates 1996; Maki 1989, 1996, 1998a, 1998b; 
Dow 1990a, 2001] 
 Heterodox economists characterize their common sense propositions by stating that the real 
(actual) economy is a non-ergodic, independent system with human agency and economic-social-
political structures and institutions embedded in an historical process located in historical time.  
Other propositions accepted and articulated which support and clarify the above include: the actual 
economy and the society in which it is embedded is real and exists independently of the heterodox 
economist; the economy is transmutable, hence its future is uncertain and  unknowable; ends are not 
entirely knowable nor independent of the means to achieve them; economic change comes about 
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through human action interacting with social, political, and economic structures and institutions; 
human action is derived in part from ethical, cultural, political, and ideological beliefs so that 
economic outcomes are also ethical and political outcomes as well; and a capitalist society is a class 
society and the economy is permeated with hierarchical power derived in part from it.  The final 
common sense proposition is that the study of particular economic activity cannot be done 
independently of the whole economy or from the social system in which it is embedded.  Mutually 
shared among heterodox economists, these common sense propositions provide the basis for its 
ontological realism foundation. [Wilber and Harrison 1978; Gruchy 1987; Lawson 1994, 1999a; 
Arestis 1996; Davidson 1996; Dow 1999, 2001; Downward 1999; Rotheim 1999] 
 From the common sense propositions, heterodox economists conclude that the economy 
works in terms of causal-historical processes.  Moreover, because they accept the ontological 
constraint implicit in this, a specific form of realism, critical realism, is the ontological basis of 
heterodox economics.  Not only do they posit that economic phenomenon are real, heterodox 
economists also argue that their explanations or factual theories refer to real things, represent real 
entities, are judged good or bad, true or false by virtue of the way the economy works, and are causal 
explanations.
11
  As a causal explanation, theory provides an account of the process as a sequence of 
economic events and depicts the causes that propel one event to another in a sequence.  In addition, 
while accepting at the minimum a correspondence theory of truth with regard to evaluating theories, 
they also accept epistemological relativism, which is that knowledge of economic events is 
historically contingent, and integrate the two.  Finally, to ensure that their factual theories are causal 
explanations of real things, heterodox economists adopt the methodological guideline of the method 
of grounded theory. [Maki 1989, 1992a, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2001; Ellis 1985]  
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Critical Realism 
 Critical realism starts with an account of what the economic world must be like before it is 
investigated by economists and for economic analysis to be possible. Thus its fundamental claim is 
that the economic world is causally structured which means, as will be subsequently argued, that 
economic theories are historical and narratively structured.  Critical realism begins with four 
propositions, the first being that the economic world consists not only of events and our experiences, 
but also of underlying structures and causal mechanisms that are in principle observable and 
knowable.  Second, it is argued that economic events, structures and causal mechanisms exist 
independently of their identification.  Third is the argument that all economic events are produced by 
an underlying set of causal mechanisms and structures.  Finally, as an a posteriori observation, it is 
commonly noted that the social world is open in that economic events are typically produced as a 
result of interactions of numerous, often counteracting structures and contingently related causal 
mechanisms.  Consequently, there is a three-tier view of economic reality.  The first two tiers are the 
empirical events of experience and impression and the actual events underlying them.  Understanding 
the former depends on the explanations of the actual events and that is derived from causal 
mechanism(s) and economic structures, which constitute the third tier of economic reality.  The 
causal mechanisms and structures together are the ontological core of heterodox economics in that 
when they are identified and understood, the empirical and actual events are jointly understood.  
Moreover, because causal historical processes are knowable and observable, so are the causal 
mechanisms and structures.  Thus for the heterodox economist, identifying structures and causal 
mechanisms and describing their way of influencing or acting on specific events in the open 
economic world is their scientific undertaking; putting critical realism into practice thereby making 
the unknown knowable and the unseen observable although it will not be perfect.
12
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 A causal mechanism in the context of heterodox economics is irreducible, has a relatively 
constant internal organization whose components are intentionally not mechanistically related, is 
real, observable, and underlies, hence governs or produces actual events, and acts transfactually (that 
is acts and has effects even when it does not generate discernable actual events).
13
  Being irreducible 
means that the form and organization cannot be disaggregated into its constituent components and 
still function as a causal mechanism.  In this sense, a causal mechanism is an emergent entity in that 
its properties and powers cannot be completely traced to its individual components.  To have a 
constant form and organization means that the mechanism can be empirically identified by stable 
patterns of behavior and organizational format and hence empirically observed and delineated.  
Furthermore, the ability to act means that the mechanism has the power to generate qualitative and/or 
quantitative outcomes; and the triggering of the mechanism comes from agency, human 
intentionality.  Thus economic actors have independent power to initiated actions, therefore setting in 
motion causal mechanisms which generate outcomes that underlie hence govern actual economic 
events.  Because the causal mechanism utilizes the same processes when producing results, the same 
results are repeatedly produced; and conversely, a causal mechanism does not produce accidental, 
random, transitory results.
14
  So to say that a causal mechanism acts transfactually producing the 
same results is also to say that its form and internal organization are constant thereby making it a 
relatively enduring entity. Hence, if the same causal mechanism operates in different situations, it 
will produce the same, or transfactual, results each time it is in operation; but the empirical and 
actual events need not be regular or repeatable, as other contingently related causal mechanisms may 
be affecting them.  However, in an open system, a causal mechanism only has the tendency to 
produce regular, repeatable qualitative or quantitative actual economic events denoted as demi-
regularities.  
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 Structure is different from causal mechanism in that it does not include human agency, hence 
it can only help shape or govern the actual event.  Otherwise it is similar to a causal mechanism in 
that it is real, observable, relatively enduring in form and organization, irreducible, and governs 
transfactually.  The structures of an economy have two additional properties:  (1) being sustained, 
reproduced, and slowly transformed by economic and social events that are caused by human action 
through their causal mechanisms; and (2) their form and organization have a historical character.  
Moreover, all economic structures are social structures in that they represent and delineate recurrent 
and pattern interactions between economic agents or between economic agents and technology and 
resources.  Economic structures include economic and social norms, practices and conventions, 
social networks such as associational networks or interlocking directorates, technological networks 
such as the production and cost structures of a business enterprise or the input-output structure of an 
economy, and economic, political, and social institutions such as markets or the legal system.  As 
distinct entities, neither causal mechanisms nor structures can separately cause and govern actual 
economic events.  Rather they must work jointly where the structures provide the medium or the 
conditions through which causal mechanisms via human agency act.  So, as long as they remain 
enduring, there will be a tendency for regular and repeatable actual economic events to occur.  In 
fact, in a transmutable world where the future is not completely knowable, agency is only possible if 
causal mechanisms and structures are relatively enduring so that the agents can connect their acts to 
outcomes; for if agents could not see themselves producing transfactual results, they would not act.
15
 
[Maki 1989, 1998b; Lovering 1990; Kanth 1992; Sayer 1992; Lloyd 1993; Lawson 1994, 1997a, 
1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Ingham 1996; Lawson, Peacock, and Pratten 1996; Wellman and 
Berkowitz 1997; Fleetwood 2001a, 2001b; Hodgson 1998, 2000; Joseph 1998; Dow 1999; 
Downward 1999; Rotheim 1999] 
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Epistemological Relativism 
 Epistemological relativism is the view that knowledge of economic events is historically 
contingent.  That is, because the social and economic activities of interest to heterodox economists 
change over time, knowledge and understanding of them is historically contingent; hence there are no 
eternal 'truths' and knowledge is always in the process of being created, even for past events.   
Consequently, what is known about actual economic events of the past need not be knowledge about 
current or future economic events.  As a result, heterodox economists are continually engaged in 
creating new knowledge, new explanations to take the place of those that cease to refer to real things, 
represent real entities, and explain actual economic events.  Thus explanations or theories are 
historically conditioned hence historically contingent, which implies that, for heterodox economists, 
there are no ahistorical economic laws or regularities.  Moreover, it is not possible to make 
ahistorical, general statements with absolute certainty beyond the historical data and context in which 
the statements are embedded.  Another implication is that theories must be, in some sense, grounded 
in historical data in order to tell historical stories explaining historical economic events.  A third 
implication is that the difference between good and not-so-good, between true and simply plain 
wrong theories is how well their explanations correspond if not ‗embody‘ to the historically 
contingent economic events being explained.  Finally, epistemological relativism implies that the 
continual creation of knowledge is a social act carried out by informed actors, that is by heterodox 
economists, in a socially, historically contingent context. [Sayer 1992; Lawson 1997a; Pratt 1995; 
Yeung 1997] 
Method of Grounded Theory 
 To develop a factual theory that analytically explains causally related, historically contingent 
economic events, the critical realist heterodox economist needs to identify and delineate the 
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structures, causal mechanisms, and causal processes producing them.  The methodological guideline 
for creating causally factual explanatory theories that is also consistent with realism, critical realism, 
and epistemological relativism is the method of grounded theory.
16
  The method of grounded theory 
can be described as a guideline qua process by which researchers, or more specifically economists, 
create their theory 'directly' developed from data (which are not the same as the ‗objective facts‘ of 
the empirist); and in which data collection, theoretical analysis, and theory building proceed 
simultaneously--see Figure 1.1.
17
  The use of the method begins with the economist‘s becoming 
familiar with, but not dogmatically committed to, the relevant theoretical, empirical, and historical 
literature that might assist them in approaching, understanding, and evaluating the data relevant to 
their research interest.  Then, one engages in 'field work' by collecting comparable data from 
economic events from which a number of specific categories or analytical qua theoretical concepts 
and their associated properties are isolated and the relationships between them identified.  With the 
theoretical concepts and relationships empirically grounded in detail and hence empirically justified, 
the economist then develops a theory in the form of a complex analytical explanation based on the 
data's core concepts.  The essential property of the theory is that it explains why and how the 
sequence of economic events represented in the data took place.  Hence, the economist does not 
attempt to construct a simplified or realistically deformed empirically grounded theory by ignoring or 
rejecting particular data.  Rather, the economist endeavors to capture the complexity of the data by 
establishing many different secondary concepts and relationships and weaving them together with the 
core concepts into structures and causal mechanisms.  This ensures that the resulting theory is 
conceptually dense as well as having causal explanatory power.  The process of selecting the central 
theoretical concepts and developing the theory brings to light secondary concepts and relationships 
that also need further empirical grounding, as well as suggesting purely analytical concepts and 
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relationships which need empirical grounding if they are to be integrated into the theory.  After the 
theory is developed, the economist will evaluate it by seeing how it explains actual economic events. 
Figure 1.1 
 Schema of the Grounded Theory Method 
 Pre-existing ideas and concepts 
              │ 
              │ 
      ┌────Data collected with constant comparisons──┐ 
      │                                   │                                          │ 
      │                                      │                                          │ 
      │  Theoretical categories identified from the data       │ 
      │                                      │                                          │ 
      │                                      │                                          │ 
      │         Core theoretical categories identified               │ 
      │                                      │                                          │ 
      │                                      │                                          │ 
      │   Core theoretical categories developed───────┘ 
      │                                      │ 
      │           │    
      │ Substantive theory/basic social process 
      │                                      │ 
      │                                      │ 
      └──────────Formal theory 
 
 Let us now consider aspects of the grounded theory method in more detail.  First, the 
collection of data is a complex task that involves collecting the data themselves, that is counting up 
pieces of data, as well as constantly comparing, analyzing, and interpreting the data collected while 
simultaneously organizing them into generalized categories qua theoretical concepts.  The theoretical 
categories that emerge come from the data themselves, not after they are all collected, but in the 
process of collecting them.
18
  Consequently each category is tied to or empirically grounded in its 
data; and since the data is real, observable, measurable, so is the theoretical category.
19
  Moreover, 
since the data lies in time and history, each theoretical category is anchored in a particular historical 
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setting.  In short, a grounded theory category is theoretical and actual, grounded in real time, and 
historically specific. 
 The purpose of constant comparison of the data is to see whether they support and continue to 
support emerging categories.
20
  Thus, each theoretical category that becomes established will have 
been repeatedly present in very many comparable pieces of data derived from multi-sources.
21
  In this 
way individual pieces of data that would not be significant on their own obtain a collective, emergent 
significance.  The categories that emerge are of two types:  one that is derived directly from the data 
and the other that is formulated by the economist.  The former tends to denote data self-description 
and actual processes and behavior while the latter tend to denote explanations.
22
  In addition, each 
category will have properties also derived from data in the same manner, that is, by using constant 
comparisons.  The more properties a category has, the denser and hence the more realistic it is.  A 
grounded theory category does not ignore the complexity of reality; rather it embraces it. 
 In the process of collecting data, the economist may feel that what is being collected is not 
revealing additional properties of a specific kind that they believe, owing to their familiarity with the 
relevant theoretical, empirical, and historical literature, might exist.  As a result, the economist will 
engage in theoretical sampling.  This involves sampling or collecting data that are expected to 
increase the density of a specific category by producing more properties, as well as increasing the 
number of pieces of data supporting each of the properties, hence making it more definitive and 
analytically useful.
23
  Theoretical sampling and collection of data for a single category, as well as for 
a range of categories, continues until theoretical saturation is reached, that is when no new data 
regarding a category and the relationships between the categories continue to emerge.
24
  The 
significance of this empirical grounding process is that the theoretical categories cannot be unrealistic 
hence false since they are derived from the data.  If the data collection and theoretical sampling is 
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incomplete then the categories will not be adequately dense, as relevant properties will be missing; 
thus such categories will be incompletely realistic.  On the other hand, if future data emerges which 
the empirical grounding process shows do not fall into a previously existing category, then that 
category is not relevant, but it is not empirically false. 
 Once the real, observable theoretical categories are delineated and grounded, the economist, 
perceiving a pattern of relationships among them, will put critical realism into practice by classifying 
some directly as economic structures and others as components of economic structures.  Continuing 
the practice, other categories that centered on human motivation and action and a set of outcomes 
will be woven together into a causal mechanism.  The resulting structures and causal mechanisms 
will be real, observable as opposed to unreal, metaphoric, and hidden.  That is, to observe a structure 
or causal mechanism is to observe the working together of its observed concrete components, 
including the human actions involved, much as a family is observed through the interaction of its 
members.  Hence structures and causal mechanisms are real, observable precisely because their 
categories are real and observable. 
 Given the research interest, the economist will select from the causal mechanisms identified, 
one as the central causal mechanism around which the structures and secondary causal mechanisms 
with their outcomes are arranged.  Criteria for selecting the central causal mechanism from among a 
number of possible causal mechanisms include the following:  that it appears frequently in the data as 
a cause of the outcomes, that it has clear implications for a more general theory, and that it allows for 
complexity.  Thus the causal mechanism is central to the narrative to be analytically developed in 
conjunction with the economic structures and secondary causal mechanisms.  More specifically, the 
narrative is not a description of present or a recounting of past unique and/or demi-regular economic 
events, although both techniques of presenting empirical and actual economic events are included in 
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the narrative.  Rather, it is a complex analytical explanation of those described or recounted events.  
Even when the basic narrative is decided upon, its development will involve further theoretical 
sampling and collecting of data as new properties for the existing structures and causal mechanisms 
emerge.  Consequently, the narrative evolves into an economic theory while at the same time 
becoming increasingly denser (in terms of properties and empirical grounding) as well as 
increasingly complex.   
 The complexity arises because of the variations in the categories and in the properties of the 
categories that make up the theory.  The grounded economic theory that eventually emerges is a 
complex analytical explanation or interpretation of the actual economic events represented in the 
data.  Thus the theory is not a generalization from the data, but of the data; that is, a grounded theory 
does not go beyond the data on which it is based--it does not claim universality or the status of an 
empirical-theoretical law.
25
  In addition, since the theory is a clear theoretical account of empirical 
and actual events that occur in historical time, the three-tier view of economic reality collapses into a 
single integrated tier for the heterodox economist.  With the grounded theory in hand, the heterodox 
economist can directly ―see‖ the causal mechanisms and structures and ―hear‖ the economic actors 
determining the empirical and actual events—the mysterious, randomness, and unintelligibility is 
replaced by clear explanation.  Moreover, being a weave of a central causal mechanism, secondary 
causal mechanisms, and economic structures designed to explain actual economic events in historical 
time, the theory also consists of descriptively realistic (as opposed to stylized or fictionalized) 
descriptions of economic events and accurate narratives of sequences of economic events.  As a 
result, the grounded economic theory is an emergent entity, a concatenated theory that cannot be 
disassembled into separate parts.  Hence the question of logical coherence of a deductivist kind 
cannot be applied to a grounded theory; instead the coherence of the theory is judged on how well its 
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explanation corresponds to the actual historically contingent economic events.
26
 
 Economic theory centered on a single central causal mechanism is classified as a substantive 
economic theory since it is an explanation of a single basic economic process that occurs widely in 
the economy.  From a number of substantive theories, a formal economic theory can be developed 
into a general or holistic theory where the relationship or pattern among the substantive theories is its 
analytical explanation.
27
  As in the process of grounding the substantive economic theory, the formal 
theory also has to be grounded.  In particular, the relationships between the substantive theories that 
constitutes the formal theory need to be grounded in data assisted and directed by theoretical 
sampling.  Consequently, the formal economic theory is grounded, historically contingent, and its 
analytical explanations are not empirical extrapolations.  As the economic world is not static, a 
formal theory is never complete, but undergoes continual modification with ever newer data relating 
to newly emerging patterns or configurations of economic reality. 
 There are two aspects of the grounded theory method that need further delineation.  The first 
deals with the role of pre-existing ideas, concepts, and categories, that is, the issue that all 
observations, data and descriptions are theory laden.  To use the method fruitfully, the heterodox 
economist must become familiar with the contemporary theoretical and non-theoretical literature, the 
controversies between economists, and the relevant literature from the history of economic thought.
28
 
 In particular, they need to make a detailed and critical investigation of the pre-existing heterodox 
ideas and concepts to see which lend themselves to empirical grounding.  The economist also needs 
to be familiar with some of the empirical literature as well as with the relevant literature from 
economic history.  By acquiring a critical awareness of the pre-existing economic theories and 
empirical findings, the economist acquires a theoretical sensitivity regarding the data and theoretical 
concepts they will be examining, comparing, and empirically grounding.  As a result, the economist 
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will have the ability to recognize what might be important in the data and to give it meaning as well 
as recognizing when the data do not support a pre-existing theoretical concept or category, requires a 
large or small transformation of the pre-existing concept or category, or 'produce' a new category.  
Thus, the grounded theory method not only recognizes that observations, data, and descriptions are 
theory laden, it reinforces the latter by demanding that all economists enter into theory creation as 
theoretically knowledgeable and aware individuals, as well as with the conviction that the creation of 
a new substantive economic theory will most likely require them to set aside forever some of that 
acquired knowledge.
29
  By acknowledging the issue of theory-laden observations while at the same 
time demanding that the economist be skeptical of all pre-existing theory, the grounded theory 
method is a highly self-conscious, engaging and open-minded approach to economic research, data 
creation-collection, and theory building. 
 The second aspect deals with evaluating a grounded theory.  It is noted above that, since the 
categories that constitute the theory are intimately linked with the data, the grounded theory itself can 
not be falsified.  More specifically, because a grounded theory is developed with the empirical data 
rather than prior to it, it does not stand independently of the data.  Thus, it is not possible to test for 
the truth or falsity of a grounded theory by checking it against the independently given empirical 
evidence.  But a grounded theory can be evaluated by how well it explains actual economic events, 
that is how well it identifies empirically and weaves together the causal mechanisms, structures, and 
descriptions into a narrative of the economic events being explained.  In short, a grounded theory 
refers to real things, represents real entities, and is evaluated on how well it corresponds to the causal 
way the economy actually is.
30
  The evaluation process takes place within a community of scholars, 
in that papers delineating tentative drafts of the theory are presented to colleagues at conferences and 
seminars for critical comments; and more refined presentations of the theory are published where 
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colleagues have the opportunity to point out inadequacies.  Through this cooperative process of 
economic-writing, economic-reading, and critical commentary, the community of heterodox 
economists arrives at adequate theories, which clearly illustrates the social nature of knowledge 
construction.
31
  Consequently, a grounded theory is, in the first instance, only as good as its 
theoretical categories.  If the data selected do not cover all aspects of the economic event(s) under 
investigation; if the economist compiles categories and properties from only part of the data collected 
or forces data into pre-determined categories; if the density of the categories is small or the 
relationships between categories under-grounded due to incomplete data collected; if the economist 
choose the ‗wrong‘ central causal mechanism; and/or if the narrative is static, terse, unable to fully 
integrate structures and central and secondary causal mechanisms, and relatively uncomplex, then the 
commentary of critics will make it clear that the economic theory is poor, ill-developed hence to a 
greater or lesser extent unrealistic, and unable to provide a comprehensive and convincing 
explanation of actual economic events.
32
  As a result, the economist will have to begin the theory 
creation process anew. 
 A second way to evaluate a grounded economic theory is to see how well it deals with new 
data.  That is, the relatively enduring structures, causal mechanisms and their outcomes of a grounded 
theory are based on data collected in a specific time period.  Thus, it is possible to evaluate whether 
they have remain enduring outside the time period by confronting them with 'new' data derived from 
replicating studies, especially data from actual events that at first glance appears to fall outside 
existing categories and not to support expected transfactual results.  If the new data falls within the 
existing categories and conforms to the transfactual results, then the structures and causal 
mechanisms have been relatively enduring.
33
  On the other hand, if the new data falls outside the 
existing categories and not supporting the transfactual results, then at least some of the structures and 
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causal mechanisms have changed.  Consequently, the existing grounded economic theory needs to be 
modified or replaced by a completely new one.  Therefore, theory evaluation in the grounded theory 
method based on the introduction of new data is designed to check the continual correspondence of 
the theory with the real causes of ongoing unique and demi-regular economic events.  Hence, it is 
essentially a positive way of promoting theory development and reconstruction as well as new theory 
creation when the correspondence between theory and events breaks down. 
 The fact that good or poor research practices lead to better or worse grounded economic 
theories indicates that choices made by economists do affect the final outcome.  Therefore, within the 
grounded theory method it is possible, although not likely, to have good but different substantive and 
formal economic theories for the same economic events.  Given the same theoretical categories, a 
different choice of a central causal mechanism will produce a different theory; or if the same central 
causal mechanism is used but integrated with different structures and secondary causal mechanisms a 
different theory will also be produced.
34
  However, since heterodox economists are realists and 
critical realists, and their theories concern causal historical events, they do not accept the possibility 
that there is no empirical data that could distinguish between two incompatible theories.  Thus, 
following the same procedures as above, the way forward for the grounded theorist would be to 
collect new data to see which of the two theories they support supplemented by critical commentary 
from colleagues.  Hence, although the procedures used are the same and the data collected are, in 
principle, the same, checking the continual explanatory adequacy of a grounded theory is a different 
activity from choosing between two different theories, for the former produces a historically linked 
sequence of grounded theories, while the latter concludes that one of the two theories is not an 
explanation after all. [Annells 1996; Glaser and Strauss 1967; Conrad 1978; Turner 1981, 1983; 
Charmaz 1983; Strauss 1987; Konecki 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994; Corbin and Strauss 
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1990; Glaser 1992, 2007; Dey 1999, 2007; Finch 1999, 2002; Tsang and Kwan 1999; Bigus, Hadden, 
and Glasner 1994; Tosh 1991; Diesing 1971; Wilber and Harrison 1978; Fusfeld 1980; Gruchy 1987; 
Wisman and Rozansky 1991; Boylan and O'Gorman 1995; Atkinson and Oleson 1996; Runde 1998; 
Sayer 1992; Megill 1989; Emigh 1997; Maki 1990, 2001; McCullagh 2000; Hunt 1994; Pentland 
1999; Ellis 1985; Lewis and Grimes 1999] 
Methodological Issues 
 The grounded theory method of theory creation effectively dismisses not only the traditional 
issue of the realisticness of assumptions but also the role of assumptions in theory creation and 
development.  That is, since assumptions as a basis for theory creation are not part of the grounded 
theory method and hence not grounded in the real world, the degree of their realisticness or their 
adequacy as a logical axiomatic foundation for theory is not a concern.  As noted above, this implies 
that logical coherence is irrelevant for evaluating grounded theories.  Moreover, because the role of 
theoretical isolation in traditional theory building and theorizing is dependent on assumptions, their 
absence in the grounded theory method means that grounded theories are not isolated theories that 
exclude possible influencing factors.  The combination of critical realism, with its structures, causal 
mechanisms, and epistemological relativism, and the grounded theory method produces theories that 
include all the relevant factors and influences, are historically contingent, and exist in ‗real‘ space 
and time.  To deliberately exclude some factors would leave the mechanisms, structures, and theories 
insufficiently empirically grounded; and to claim to establish laws and certain (timeless) knowledge 
would remove the mechanisms, structures, and theories from the real world economic events they are 
to explain.  Thus, the integration of critical realism and grounded theory results in theories and 
theorizing fundamentally different from the traditional mode.
35
  In particular, it means that heterodox 
economic theory is not an axiomatic-based approach to theory creation, does not use deductivist 
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methods to create theory, and rejects every method of theory creation that is not empirically 
grounded.  On the other hand, their integration produces their own set of methodological issues, 
centering on the nature of data, the case study method, mathematics and economic models, and 
econometrics. [Spiethoff 1953; Maki 1989, 1992a, 1992b, 1998b]  
Data 
 Originally, the grounded theory method was developed as a way to utilize qualitative data to 
build a theory; however, the use of quantitative data was not excluded.  As economists are interested 
in developing historically grounded explanations of past and present economic events, their possible 
sources of data include all existing written, recorded, physical, and quantitative records.  Since 
existing data sources might provide an incomplete record of economic events, the economist must 
also utilize different research strategies--such as surveys, interviews and oral statements, 
ethnographic and industrial archaeology studies, questionnaires, mapping, direct observation, 
participation in activities, fieldwork, and statistical analysis--to create new qualitative and 
quantitative data.
36
  In this context, subjective evaluations and interpretations of future possibilities 
constitute a particular kind of qualitative data that require particular research strategies to observe 
and record.
37
  For example, when it is important to explain how and why particular business 
decisions are made and who made them, the economist will need to create narrative accounts of 
relevant lived-historical experiences embedded within the cultural milieu of particular business 
enterprises.  Thus they will need to examine letters and other written documents, undertake 
interviews and other oral documentation, and possibly engage in participant observation in which the 
economist may directly engage with, for example, the enterprise in the process of collecting data.  
What constitutes appropriate data depends on the object of inquiry; but it is important that much of 
the data deals with process, intentionality and their outcomes.  Consequently, real, observable, and 
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measurable theoretical categories, hence real, observable, and measurable economic structures and 
causal mechanisms, are empirically grounded in both qualitative and quantitative data obtained from 
various sources.  Thus, the analytical narrative or theory is grounded in many different types of 
data.
38
 [Goulding 2002] 
Case Study 
 The theoretical categories that make up grounded theories are based on an array of 
comparable data generated by case studies.  A case study is defined as an in-depth, multifaceted 
investigation of a particular object or theme where the object or theme gives it its unity.  The object 
or theme can be historical or a current real-life event and the study will use several kinds of 
qualitative and quantitative data sources.  For example, the theme of a case study can be the pricing 
procedures used by business enterprises; consequently the case study will be the collection, 
comparison, categorization, and tabulation of pricing procedures obtained from various empirical 
pricing studies along with a critical narrative that examines and integrates the data.  Thus, the case 
study approach is the principle method of qualitative and quantitative data collection and comparison 
used to develop categories, structures, and causal mechanisms.  Moreover, by providing information 
from a number of different data sources over a period of time, it permits a more holistic study of 
structures and causal mechanisms. 
 A case study does not stand-alone and cannot be considered alone; it must always be 
considered within a family of comparable case studies.  If the economist is faced with a shortage of 
case studies, the response is not to generalize from them but to undertake more case studies.  
Moreover, theoretical sampling is specifically carried out through case studies in that the economist 
makes a conscious decision to undertake a particular case study in order to increase the empirical 
grounding of particular theoretical categories.
39
  Thus a case study can be of an individual business 
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enterprise and the theme of the study can be to delineate the complex sets of decisions regarding 
pricing, production, and investment and to recount their effects over time.  On the other hand, it can 
be concerned with a particular theoretical point, such as pricing, examined across many different case 
studies of different enterprises.  The different cases not only provide comparable data for 
comparisons but also descriptions of structures and causal mechanisms and a narrative of the causal 
mechanism in action over time.  A third type of case study is a narrative that explains an historical or 
current event.  The narrative includes structures and causal mechanisms which, when combined with 
the history or facts of the event, explains how and why it took place.  Hence, this type of case study is 
both a historical and theoretical narrative, an integration of theory with the event.  Consequently, it 
provides a way to check how good the theory is and, at the same time, contributes to its grounding 
and extension. A robust substantive theory is one that can be utilized in an array of case studies of 
historical and current events.
40
 [Smith 1998; Stake 1998; Eisenhardt 1989; Orum, Feagin, and 
Sjoberg 1991; Wieviorka 1992; Vaughan 1992; Finch 1999, 2002; Scheibl and Wood 2005; Yin 
1981a, 1981b, 1994; George 1979; Sayer 1992] 
Mathematics and Economic Models 
 
 Mathematics and economic models are useful as tools and instruments that can contribute to 
the development and evaluation of causal mechanisms and grounded theory.  Their uses are, 
however, restricted since the tenets of realism, critical realism, and the method of grounded theory 
prescribe that the type of mathematics used and factual economic models constructed are derived 
from (as opposed to being imposed upon via analogy or metaphor) the empirically grounded theories 
being developed.  Consequently, the economic model reflects the narrative of the theory from which 
it is derived.
41
 Model building involves translating a grounded theory into a factual economic model, 
which means its structures and causal mechanisms (which embody accurate measurements and 
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observations) have to be converted, as far as possible, into mathematical language where each 
mathematical entity and concept is in principle unambiguously empirically grounded, meaning in part 
they also have to be measurable and observable.  As a result, the mathematical form of the model is 
determined and constrained by the empirically grounded structures (such as the input structures of a 
input-output model) and causal mechanisms (such as investment decisions by business enterprises), 
and hence is isomorphic with the theory and its empirical data.
42
  In this manner, mathematical 
model-based analysis is derived from and remains subjugated to the study of agency-structure 
determined economic activity.  If an economic model has only empirically grounded structures and 
no agency, then it is not well-grounded and nor are its solutions; and if the model‘s structures and 
agency are not empirically grounded, then its outcomes have no meaning.  Thus, while mathematics 
helps illuminate aspects of the grounded theory and making clear what might be obscure, it does not 
add anything new to the theory.  That is, it does not by itself produce new scientific knowledge; or 
more strongly, it is not possible to have a non-empirically grounded model say anything about the 
real world.  Such models represent bogus or pseudo-knowledge.
43
 
 One implication is that the model's mathematical form is not derived by analogy or based on a 
metaphor, both of which are not constrained by reality.  A second is that the model is an accurate, but 
reflective, description of the grounded theory and its data and therefore not a simplification of it.
44
  
And a third is that the economic model is constructed in terms of historical time.  That is, the 
economic model cannot be mathematically framed to deal with theoretical problems that do not exist 
in the data—grounded models do not permit the making up of fictitious theoretical problems which 
are then solved for.  This means that it must be open in order to deal with real historical events and 
contribute to the historical narrative which also means that economic models just cannot be anything, 
rather they must be empirically-historically something.  Additional implications are that the 
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relationships between the variables in the model are derived from the empirically grounded theory as 
opposed to being assumed fictions, that the same model is used in both theoretical and applied work, 
that the model does not operate mechanistically like a machine, and that different grounded economic 
theories have different models.  Consequently the mathematical-theoretical arguments and the 
measurable and observable numerical outcomes derived from the model are determined, constrained, 
and real.  In particular, the outcomes of the model are not logical deductions from given axioms or 
unique (or multiple) mathematical solutions; rather they are non-logical empirically grounded 
outcomes.  Such mathematical-theoretical arguments and models derived from empirically grounded 
theories are characterized as rigorous and non-deductive.  Thus, this form of mathematical argument 
cannot be used to transform economic reasoning and explanation into mathematical formalism with 
its chains of mathematical-deductive reasoning. 
 Being isomorphic with the theory and its data, yet an alternative representation of the theory, 
a model can be used by the economist to obtain a better understanding of the theory itself as well as 
an analytical-narrative summary for pedagogical purposes.  In addition, it can be used to examine and 
evaluate propositions found in the theoretical literature.  That is, the mathematical-theoretical 
arguments derived from a rigorous economic model can be used to examine whether particular 
mathematical-theoretical propositions associated with different economic theories and models are 
also rigorous or have no empirical grounding hence real world existence.  Because it is grounded in 
the existing data, it is independent of new and future data.  Thus, it can be used, for example, for 
discussing economic policies and simulating their possible impacts on future economic events.  In 
particular it is a way of visually picturing the economy and simulating its evolving, moving 
outcomes.  Economic models can also be used to see whether the resulting outcomes of new data 
conform to the expected outcome patterns of the theory and to explore the impact of changing 
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structures and causal mechanisms on economic outcomes.  In this last case, for example, if a 
structure is hypothetically altered so that the economic model produces hypothetical different 
outcomes, the outcomes can then be compared to actual outcomes.  If they seem to be the same, then 
the structures of the theory need to be re-examined and the process of grounding the theory renewed. 
[Weintraub 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 2002; Israel 1981, 1991; Boylan and O'Gorman 1995; Boland 1989; 
Dupre‘ 2001; Morrison and Morgan 1999; Eichner 1987; Carrier 1992; Setterfield 1995; Bunge, 
1983a] 
Econometrics 
 
 The tenets of critical realism and the grounded theory method also constrain econometrics to 
use as a statistical tool to assist the development and delineation of causal mechanisms and to 
evaluate the adequacy of grounded economic theories.
45
  In the process of transforming the 
empirically grounded categories into an economic theory, the economist will provisionally identify 
structures and causal mechanisms with particular transfactual outcomes.  To aid them in their 
identification, the economist may subject the causal mechanism and its outcomes to econometric 
testing.  The econometric model used will include components for the quantitative representation of 
structures as well as components for the causal mechanism; and its particular statistical form will be 
determined by the causal mechanism.  If the econometric tests support the existence of the causal 
mechanism's transfactual outcomes, then the empirical grounding of the causal mechanism is 
enhanced.  Failure of the tests would, on the other hand, indicate that the causal mechanism and its 
associated structures are inadequately developed and needed further development.  Assuming the 
testing a success and in light of the other qualitative and quantitative empirical support, the 
economist can provisionally identify the causal mechanism and its transfactual outcomes.  At this 
stage, they can engage in further theoretical sampling to see if additional qualitative and quantitative 
  
 
 
 
 
38 
evidence support it; and econometric testing can again be utilized in this context.  Thus econometric 
testing is not about future predictions, as the economy is open and always changing, but about 
understanding the relationship between the causal mechanism and its transfactual outcomes.  If 
econometric testing of new data fails to support the causal mechanism and its outcomes, then the 
implication is that the structures and causal mechanisms have changed; it then becomes necessary to 
re-ground them. 
 Econometrics is also useful for evaluating grounded theories that may be associated with 
demi-regularities.
46
  In this case, the economic theory will be modeled so as to include all the 
structures, the primary causal mechanism, and the secondary causal mechanisms.  If the testing is a 
success, then it can be more strongly argued that there exists a demi-regularity associated with the 
primary causal mechanism of the theory.  But if the testing is not successful, then all that can be said 
is that it is less likely that the theory has a demi-regularity.  Hence econometric testing provides a 
way to evaluate the continual correspondence of the theory with the real causes of ongoing economic 
events.  By doing so, it contributes to the promotion of new theory building when the correspondence 
between theory and events break down. [Lawson 1989; Downward 1999, 2003; Downward and 
Mearman 2002; Lee and Downward 1999; Yeung 1997] 
HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF HETERODOX ECONOMIC THEORIES 
 The common sense propositions combined with realism and critical realism exclude, as part 
of heterodox theorizing, ahistorical, atemporal entities and theoretical concepts, atemporal diagrams, 
given known ends independent of means or processes to attain them, models and other forms of 
analysis unaccompanied by temporal-historical analysis, and the utilization of ahistorical first 
principles or primary causes.  Being outside of history, historical time, and an unknowable 
transmutable future, these ahistorical entities and concepts are also rejected by the grounded theory 
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method as fictitious since they do not emerge as categories in the historical data.  Consequently, 
ahistorical theories with their ahistorical concepts are not connected to the range of economic events 
they intend to explain and hence are not capable of explaining them.  In contrast, the concatenated 
integration of the common sense propositions, realism and critical realism with the grounded theory 
method prescribes that heterodox theorizing include the delineation of historically grounded 
structures of the economy, and the development of historically grounded emergent causal 
mechanisms.  When integrated together the resulting economic theories are grounded in and linked to 
critical realism.  In addition, they are also historical theories in that they are historical narratives that 
explain the present or past internal workings of historical economic processes and events connected 
to the social provisioning process in the context of relatively stable causal mechanisms (whose 
actions and outcomes can be temporally different) and structures. That is, the simultaneous operation 
of primary and secondary causal mechanisms with different time dimensions ensures the existence of 
historical economic processes that are being explained.  But even when the causal mechanism 
conclude their activity, the historical processes do not come to an end for the secondary and other 
causal mechanism can also have an impact on the structures so that the slowly transforming 
structures (and their impact on causal mechanisms) maintain the processes. 
 Historical processes are organized and directed by structures and causal mechanisms and are 
what constitutes historical time.  Since those same structures and causal mechanisms also change 
slowly, historical processes change as well, implying that there are no end points, ‗constants‘ to 
which the processes tend or lock-in, evolutionary pathways that must be followed irrespective of 
agency, or cyclical ‗movements‘.  In short, historical change is non-teleological, non-historicist, non-
cyclical and hence just can only be change.  With historical process and historical change as intrinsic 
properties of historical theories, such outside-of-history concepts and methods as equilibrium, 
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optimization-maximization-minimization short-period/long-period positions, centers of gravitation, 
market clearing, states of rest, or comparative statics cannot be utilized to organize and direct 
economic inquiry and to narrate economic events.
47
  These concepts are sometimes theoretically 
justified in the context of a layered view of reality and economic events, since it allows some 
structures and mechanisms to exist essentially outside of time and historical process.  At other times, 
they are justified in terms of slow moving variables (structures and causal mechanisms) and fast 
moving variables (outcomes) where the latter does not have an impact upon the former.  However, 
the interplay and linkages between structures, causal mechanisms, and outcomes means that the 
distinction between the two kinds of variables is not sustainable and that consequently historical 
outcomes are not based on accidental, random, or autonomous factors; hence no structures, causal 
mechanisms, and outcomes can be independent of historical processes. In short, it is not possible to 
start with a static theory and dynamize it into a theory that explains historical processes—no 
amendments to an outside-of-history theory can transform it into a historical theory.  
Historical economic theories are possible because, as argued in critical realism, all historical 
events are, due to the existence of structures and causal mechanisms, narratively structured—there 
are no accidental or uncaused events, that is, events without a narrative.  Hence, heterodox 
economists do not impose narratives on actual economic events to make sense of them, but derive 
them from the events via the grounded theory method.
48
  Moreover, being a narrative, the theories 
have a plot with a beginning, middle, and end centered on a central causal mechanism and set within 
structures and other causal mechanisms.  Therefore, antedated events prompt the causal mechanisms 
to initiate activity to generate particular results and hence start the narrative; and it comes to an end 
when the causal mechanisms conclude their activity.  Finally, the storyteller of the narrative is the 
heterodox economist whose objective is to help the audience—who includes fellow economists, 
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students, politicians, and the general public—understand theoretically how and why the actual 
economic events transpired.
49
 [Carr 1986; Bortis 1997; Eatwell 1998; Norman 1991; McCullagh 
1984; Pentland 1999; Dey 1999; Appleby, Hunt and Jacob 1994, chs 7, 8] 
 As narratives linked with critical realism and centered on causal mechanisms and structures, 
historical heterodox theories are not completely aggregated or disaggregated; and nor are they devoid 
of explicit human intentionality and activity.  That is, because causal mechanisms embody data from 
many case studies, they aggregate economic reality or, put differently, compact the scale of reality 
and therefore the degree of detail and specificity required of the narrative.  However, the degree of 
aggregation is limited because of the existence of structures and causal mechanisms that cannot be 
aggregated or disaggregated and human intentionality and activity that are both differentiated and 
specific.  As a result, heterodox economic theories are neither an aggregate theory where the 
differentiation among the causal mechanisms, structures, and human agency disappear; nor such a 
disaggregated theory so that causal mechanisms, structures, and human agency are individual-event 
specific and hence of little interest.
50
  The impossibility of aggregating emergent entities to produce 
representational aggregate entities, that is, aggregate entities with the same properties and behavior as 
the individual entities, means that heterodox economic theory must consist of linked causal 
mechanisms and structures.  Thus, heterodox theories tell quasi-aggregated narratives explaining the 
many and overlapping actual economic events occurring in a differentiated economy.
51
 
THE MAKING OF HETERODOX MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
 Heterodox economic theory is a encompassing theoretical explanation of the social 
provisioning process within the context of a capitalist economy and therefore is concerned with 
explaining those factors that are part of the process; and heterodox microeconomic theory is one 
component of the whole.  To use critical realism and the method of grounded theory to develop a 
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microeconomic theory means first delineating the empirically grounded causal mechanisms and 
structures that make up the constituent parts of the economy and their interdependencies; and 
secondly developing theories or analytical narratives of how they contribute to explaining the social 
provisioning process.  Thus, the research and referencing requirements for developing an empirically 
grounded microeconomic theory are significant; and in some instances the necessary empirical 
evidence does not yet exist.
52
  Consequently, the microeconomic theory presented in the subsequent 
chapters will only be partially empirically grounded, leaving further work for heterodox economists 
to do.  But what will become apparent is that the empirical stipulation of the structures and causal 
mechanisms will have a significant impact on a number of theoretical issues and arguments in 
heterodox economics.  That is to say, the use of grounded theory only ‗permits‘ specific structures 
and causal mechanisms to emerge which in turn constrains the range of theoretical models, 
arguments, and narratives that can contribute to understanding the social provisioning process in 
actual capitalist economies.  This means that various arguments, models, and theories that had a 
historical explanatory role in heterodox economics will be put to the side.  This will inevitably 
generate misgivings among heterodox economists as they may well ask ‗what theory, friends, is 
this?‘.  It needs to be recognized that all knowledge is contestable and that even respected arguments 
and theories by great heterodox economists are not immune to questioning and being discarded. 
   To start the process of theory creation, the next chapter will delineate a theoretical picture of a 
capitalist economy that will serve as the foundation for developing an empirically grounded 
microeconomic theory of the social provisioning process as well as an empirically grounded model of 
the economy.  This involves delineating the core structures of a capitalist economy relevant to the 
social provisioning process and locating within them the organizations, institutions, and agency that 
direct, engage in, or facilitate the economic events that result in social provisioning.  And the 
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economic events of specific interest are those that affect the production, pricing, demand, and 
distribution of goods and services.  The structures help shape and govern economic events while the 
organizations and social institutions (that are located in the structures) house the causal mechanisms 
in which agency is embedded.  What these structures, organizations, and agencies are will in part 
determine the kind of heterodox microeconomic theory that is developed.  The core structures 
include the structure of production and the surplus and the structure of the linkages between incomes 
and the surplus;  the core organizations and social institutions relevant to the social provisioning 
process and embedded in the structures include the business enterprise, market organizations such as 
cartels, family, and the state; and the core agents or agency whose decisions direct and/or reproduce 
the social provisioning process include the business and political elite and the household.  The 
subsequent chapters represent four of the ‗core‘ components of the theory--the business enterprise, 
the business enterprise and the market, and market governance, and the economy qua social 
provisioning process as a disaggregated, interdependent whole.  More specifically, the first three core 
areas concentrate on delineating ‗micro‘ structures and causal mechanisms and developing 
substantive and formal theories of the business enterprise (chapters three and four), of market 
demand (chapter five), and of market governance (chapter six).  With the structures, causal 
mechanisms, and substantive theories in place, the final step is to develop a holistic heterodox 
microeconomic theory (chapters seven and eight) that brings together the constituent parts of the 
economy and their interdependencies.  This will involve integrating the productive and monetary 
structures of the social provisioning process, the price model, and the output-employment model into 
a model of a going economy as a whole.  Then, it will be possible to develop analytical narratives of 
the social provisioning process.  In particular, the theory and the model together will then be utilized 
to delineate the impact of the ‗micro‘—that is prices, profit mark ups, finance, and investment--on 
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the overall level of economic activity and hence on the social provisioning process. 
END NOTES 
 
1There is a debate within heterodox economics on whether heterodox and mainstream economics are 
really different or to some degree compatible, commensurable (Lee 2011a, 2011b).  Those who 
advocate the latter position discount the theoretical critiques and ignore the clearly articulated 
statements by various heterodox economists, especially Marxists, radical Institutionalists, and Post 
Keynesian-Sraffians, who claim the form position. 
2In some cases, concepts and their derivative symbols are presented in such a way so as to look like 
they are quantifiable, such as the utility function and ―U‖ for total amount of utility.  However, ―U‖ is 
not well-defined, has no dimensions, and its units of measurement are not stated.  This is a case of 
pseudoquantitation. [Bunge, 1998; Mahner, 2007] 
3To illustrate, consider the heterodox critiques of the mainstream concept of scarcity. The Post 
Keynesians (Bortis 1997) argue that produced means of production within a circular production 
process cannot be characterized as scarce and that production is a social process; while 
Institutionalists (DeGregori 1987) reject the view that natural resources are not socially created to 
enter into the production process; and the Marxists (Matthaei 1984) argue that the concept is a 
mystification and misspecification of the economic problem—that it is not the relation of the 
individual to given resources, but the social relationships that underpin the social provisioning 
process. The three critiques are complementary and integrative and generate the common conclusion 
that the concept of scarcity must be rejected as well as the mainstream approach to the study of the 
social provisioning process in terms of the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends in 
light of unlimited wants.  This is the basis to the popular statement that the only thing heterodox 
approaches have in common with each other is their opposition to mainstream economics.  But if 
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they have similar and overlapping critiques, then there is a good possibility that their positive 
analyses of the social provisioning process are also similar and integrative to some extent.  This is, 
after all, the basis for heterodox economics. 
4Other characteristics of a scientific research field include intimate relations (as opposed to 
imperialistic relations) with other research fields, direction of scientific activity determined internally 
to the research field as opposed to compliance to government, ecclesiastical, or business demands, 
and an ethos of free search for truth rather than an ethos of ideological faith, a quest for power or 
consensus, or an enforced blindness of the research community to alternative theories.  Mainstream 
economics falls short on all three accounts, most notably in countries subject to national research 
assessment exercises and where state power is used to legitimate particular approaches in a research 
field. [Lee, 2009; Bunge 1998; Mahner 2007]  
5This suggests that heterodox economists are relatively indistinguishable from their mainstream 
brethren except for their scientific output. There is, however, a difference.  Being theoretically 
different often brings the individual heterodox economist under attack if he/she works in a 
predominately mainstream department.  It also brings heterodox departments under attack by 
university administrators (and often times supported by mainstream economists) who are concerned 
about department rankings and the production and teaching of ‗improper‘ or low-value knowledge.  
For a detailed history of such incidents, see Lee (2009).  
6Gaddis (2002: 10). 
7
Since its beginnings in the 1960s and particularly since 1990, heterodox economists have been 
melding together aspects of different heterodox  approaches, see Lee (2009, 2010). 
8A number of elements constitute the theoretical core of heterodox theory. Some elements are clearly 
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associated with particular heterodox approaches as noted by Phillip O‘Hara: 
The main thing that social economists bring to the study [of heterodox economics] is an 
emphasis on ethics, morals and justice situated in an institutional setting. Institutionalists 
bring a pragmatic approach with a series of concepts of change and normative theory of 
progress, along with a commitment to policy. Marxists bring a set of theories of class and the 
economic surplus. Feminists bring a holistic account of the ongoing relationships between 
gender, class, and ethnicity in a context of difference….And post-Keynesians contribute 
through an analysis of institutions set in real time, with the emphasis on effective demand, 
uncertainty and a monetary theory of production linked closely with policy recommendations. 
(O‘Hara 2002: 611) 
However, other core theoretical elements--the socially embedded economy, the economy as an 
emergent system comprised of sub-systems, circular production, and cumulative change--emerge 
from a synthesis of arguments that are associated only in part with particular heterodox approaches.  
For a more detailed discussion of heterodox ‗metaparadigm‘ theory building, see Lee (2009, 2010); 
also see Gioia and Pitre (1990) and Lewis and Grimes (1999). 
9This position has a long lineage reflecting the influence of Karl Marx, Michael Kalecki, and Piero 
Sraffa; and since 1970 a number of heterodox economists have contributed to this tradition, including 
Kregel (1975), Pasinetti (1981, 1993), Eichner (1987), and Bortis, (1997).  As a result, much of what 
is covered in this book can also be found in the works of these authors.  This is particularly the case 
for Eichner. 
10
For example, dealing with the business enterprise and changes in anti-trust laws is not per se 
microeconomics and dealing with government expenditure decisions and fiscal policy is not per se 
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macroeconomics, which means that fiscal policy in principle is of no more or less important that 
antitrust policy; rather they are differently important. 
11The contrast to a factual theory is a theory which is concern exclusively with conceptual objects 
(scarcity) that have no connection to the real world or with theoretical objects (utility functions) that 
are explicitly divorced from the real world. 
12This implies that agency qua decision making is an objective activity as opposed to a purely 
subjective one, as found in the work of radical subjectivist Austrian economists and in variants of 
mainstream economics.  Hence, preference for ‗objective‘ structures over ‗subjective‘ agency and 
causal mechanisms in modeling and theorizing by some heterodox economists is rejected. [Sraffa 
1960; Pasinetti 1981, 1993; Kurz and Salvadori 1995, 2005; Lewis 2005] 
13Because its components are intentionally related, a causal mechanism cannot be thought of as a 
machine or ‗mechanistic‘—see Cartwright (1995) and Dupre‘ (2001) on machines and economic 
thinking. 
14
This property of causal mechanisms obviates the need for an inductivist approach for theory 
creation.  Consequently, any method of theory creation and development, such as abduction,  
retroduction or the method of grounded theory, utilized in conjunction with critical realism will not 
adopt an inductivist strategy leading to invariant laws. [Sayer 1992] 
15The Sraffian-classical long period methodology is also based on slowly changing structures; 
however, it does not include ‗slowly changing‘ agency and the interaction between agency and 
structures.  As a result, the theoretical entities determined by the structures are distinct from the 
actual entities that are determined by agency, such as long period prices and actual market prices.  
The critical realist structure-agency methodology eliminates this distinction so that the entities are 
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both theoretical and actual:  which means that actual market prices are ‗structurally‘ stable but also 
change slowly over time. 
16An alternative way of proceeding is to pursue the Babylonian method, but it is underdeveloped in 
that it advocates utilizing various research strategies to gather data from different sources, but then 
does not say how the data is transformed into a theory.  Another alternative approach is to utilize 
retroduction as the methodological guideline for theory creation.  Retroduction is a form of reasoning 
or theory construction that goes behind the surface phenomena to its causes.  It involves first a 
theoretical-abstract re-description of the events based on existing qualitative and quantitative 
material; followed by explaining the events through postulating and identifying the structures and 
causal mechanisms producing them; and ending with the theory being checked empirically.  
Although advocated, few critical realists have explicitly used it for theory construction; and when 
they have (for example Lawson 1998c), the results looks like a case study carried out according to 
the method of grounded theory.  This is because retroduction is also too undeveloped to be used as a 
way to identify causal mechanisms and structures from which to construct theories or explanations.  
In addition, it does not indicate how the causal processes should be delineated and articulated, that is 
the analytical and literary form the theory should take.  Finally, retroduction, as articulated by critical 
realists, suggests that analogies, similes, and metaphors are useful ways to identify causal 
mechanisms and structures.  But since the latter are by their nature not real, their contribution to 
theory construction is at best limited and may inadvertently direct the attention of the critical realist 
heterodox economist towards fictitious, hence empirically ungroundable, mechanisms and structures. 
[Dow 1985, 1990a, 1990b, 2001; Lawson 1996, 1997b, 1998c, 1999b, 2003; Sarre 1987; Sayer 1992; 
Pratt 1995; Boylan and O'Gorman 1995; Yeung 1997; Runde 1998; Downward 1999] 
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17
The method of grounded theory was first delineated by Barry Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) 
and then subsequently developed by them and others--see Strauss (1987), Strauss and Corbin (1990, 
1994), Dey (1999), Locke (2001), Goulding (2002), Bryant and Charmaz (2007). Similar 
methodological guidelines going by the names of holism, pattern model, method of structured-
focused comparison, and participant-observer approach using case study method were also proposed 
and developed at roughly the same time--see Diesing (1971), Wilber and Harrison (1978), George 
(1979), and Fusfeld (1980).  Finally, historical economic theories based on pattern models were 
articulated by Arthur Spiethoff and members of the German Historical School—see Betz (1988), 
Spiethoff (1952, 1953), and Hodgson (2001). 
18
What grounded theory is not about is forcing data into pre-determined set of theoretical categories; 
all categories have to be empirically justified. 
19
Observable data is not solely restricted to sense experience.  For example, historical documents or 
field reports contain data that cannot be verified by the reader's sense experience.  The same can also 
be said for oral histories that deal with past events.  On the other hand, non-written data, such as 
informal rules, hierarchical power, and expectations inside the business enterprise, are not 
unobservable in that they can be verbally articulated and hence written down, filmed and then 
identified at a later point in time, or observed as institutions, that is, as observable patterns of 
behavior hence capable of being recorded.  Thus all data is observable, although the sources and 
medium in which they exist varies; to be unobservable in this sense is not to be real and hence to be 
no data at all. 
20
Constant comparison can also involve exact replicating previous studies to see how robust they are. 
21
Another way of putting this is that a category represents a 'pattern' that the economist has 
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recognized in the data generated by replicatory or comparable studies.  Thus categories are created by 
the economist rather than ‗discovered‘ in the data; hence categories are one conceptual outcome that 
arises from the economist‘s immersion in the data.  It is in this sense that categories emerge from the 
data. [Dey 2007] 
22
In either case, the language used to describe the categories may be quite different from the existing 
theoretical language.  In particular, the building of a grounded theory may require the creation of a 
new language and discarding old words and their meanings.  On the other hand, the language used 
may come directly from the data collected and/or from commonly used language (which is generally 
not theoretical language). [Konecki 1989; Coates 1996] 
23
The point of theoretical sampling is specifically to find data to make categories denser, more 
complex.  Since the aim of the grounded theory method is to build theories based on data collected, 
the issue of generalizing in a statistical sense is not relevant.  Thus theoretical vs. statistical sampling 
has no importance for the method. [Glaser and Strauss 1967; Corbin and Strauss 1990] 
24
A saturated category is not a function of the number of pieces of data, as it may become saturated 
after only a small portion of the available data has been analyzed.  Non-parametric statistical 
techniques can be used to judge whether a category is saturated or not--see Finch and McMaster 
(2002). 
25
Thus, the grounded theory method is not the same as induction; and its practitioners view 
generalization as a problematic and unimportant goal.  Moreover, since it is compatible and 
integrated with critical realism, it cannot generate an inductivist strategy leading to empirical-
theoretical laws. [Sarre 1987; Sayer 1992] 
26
The irrelevance of logical coherence means that it is not possible to deduce unknown structures and 
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causal mechanisms from existing ones. 
27
A formal grounded theory is not more (or less) abstract than a substantive grounded theory.  
Because a grounded theory must at all times be grounded, it can not be an abstract theory where the 
modifier denotes some degree of non-groundness, such as the use of fictional categories or the 
elimination of data.  Hence grounded theories cannot be differentiated according to their levels of 
abstraction. 
28This requirement means that heterodox economists need to be familiar with the theoretical 
approaches of many of the heterodox approaches as well as their intellectual histories. 
29
By accepting that it may be necessary to cast aside previously acquired knowledge, the economist 
can still pursue the grounded theory method even though they may favor particular non-grounded 
concepts and theories.  Hence the grounded theory economist is not a neutral observer sifting through 
given ―facts‖ that present him, through some sort of immaculate conception, with a theory without a 
moment of forethought; rather the economist is actively and reflectively engaged with it. 
30This clearly implies that grounded theories are not instrumental theories, even though they share 
the property of being neither true nor false. 
31This social engagement does not always ensure that adequate theories emerge, but it is  
 
indispensible to the evaluation process.  
 
32
The often-heard phrase that "all theory is in some sense unrealistic" is not applicable to grounded 
theories.  All grounded theories are realistic in that they are grounded in every detail in data.  A 
grounded theory may be relatively complete or a much incomplete explanation of an economic event; 
but in both cases they are entirely realistic.  To be unrealistic from a grounded theory perspective is 
to include non-grounded concepts in the theory, but then it would not be grounded. 
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33
This has been called pattern-matching in that the existing theory is seen as a particular pattern of 
data and narrative and the new pattern of data with its narrative is compared to it to see if they match-
-see Wilber and Harrison (1978) and Yin (1981a, 1981b).  
34
The expectation of the grounded theory method is that the economist will seriously consider 
alternative combinations of structures and causal mechanisms before settling on a particular theory. 
35For example, from a critical realist-grounded theory perspective, an assumption-based isolative 
theory is without empirical grounding and hence has no real world sense or meaning. 
36
Created data does not pre-exist as some sort of unacknowledged sense experience or as 
unobservable data; rather being produced, it has no past.  Moreover, since economists create data, 
they have a direct and reflexive relation to it. 
37Thus, the Sraffian position that subjective evaluations and expectations are non-observables is 
rejected. 
38The combination of different types of data derived from different research methods is also called 
triangulation. [Thurmond 2001; Downward and Mearman 2007; Olsen 2003] 
 39
It is important to realize that a case study which involves the replication and re-evaluation of a 
previous case study is theoretical sampling.  In this instance, the researcher is re-examining an 
existing case study to see how robust its data and results are. 
40This type of case study is similar to the extended case method advocated by Burawoy (1991, 1998), 
with the caveat that the latter is predicated on a false dichotomy between structures and causal 
mechanisms, where structures change independently of causal mechanism, not in part because of 
them.  
41
 One implication of this position is that an economic model is no better than the theory it reflects.  
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So if the theory is ungrounded and/or theoretically incoherent, then so will be its economic models. 
42This relationship between mathematics and empirically grounded theory is similar to the late 
nineteenth century view in which mathematical rigor was established by basing the mathematics on 
physical reasoning resulting in physical models.  However, the difference here is that rigor results 
when the mathematical model is based on social reasoning represented by empirically grounded 
theory. 
43
 This approach to economic models and their contribution to economic analysis and explanation of 
the social provisioning process is distinct from how mainstream economists utilize models.  
Mainstream economists mostly do not empirically ground their models, but prefer to embed them in 
a hypothetical fantasy-based reality which they believe qua have (religious) faith in are credible 
representations of the real world.  But at other times, they base their models upon single exemplary 
case study or ‗stylized‘ facts that are not subject to constant comparisons to additional data; so 
rendering their models no more credible than entirely empirically groundless models.  However, in 
both cases the credibility of the models are enhanced by allegorical stories they tell.  In short, from a 
grounded theory perspective, mainstream economists are engaged in wrong modeling and have done 
so for the past hundred years. [Sugden 2002: 131; Morgan 2002, 2007, 2009a, 2009b] 
44
A model that simplifies a grounded theory does not accurately and concretely denotes its structures 
and leaves its causal mechanisms under-specified, under-embedded and thus ill-defined. 
45
Econometric testing can also be used to evaluate particular claims in the historical literature 
regarding causal mechanisms and transfactual outcomes. 
46Non-parametric statistics can also contribute to the analysis of demi-regularities and to measures of 
the nature of any relationship between demi-regularities cast into a contrastive relationship. [Finch 
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and McMaster, 2002]  
47This conclusion applies to mainstream theory as well as to various heterodox approaches:  for 
example:  Sraffian long period positions and Post Keynesian short period positions. 
48As long as historical events are narratively structured, subjectivity, uncertainty, and expectations do 
not introduce indeterminacy into heterodox theories. 
49The historical character of heterodox economic theories is closely aligned with the view of 
economic theories espoused by the German Historical School (Betz 1988; Spiethoff 1952, 1953). 
50The outcome of a grounded theory approach to constructing causal mechanisms is a rejection of 
methodological individualism.  While individual agents make decisions based on subjective and 
objective evaluations of a somewhat uncertain future and generate outcomes, for theoretical 
purposes, their decisions and outcomes are aggregated and embedded in a causal mechanism.  Hence, 
the empirically grounded role of the subjective and the uncertainty in the causal mechanism is 
observable, persistent, and systematic.  
51See Dopfer and Potts (2008: 21-26) for a similar argument regarding meso and macro. 
52The referencing requirements are so great for grounded theorizing that it is not possible to 
reference all the empirical evidence.  Hence only some of the evidence will be referenced in the 
book.   
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